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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Medical Malpractice Pr6blem: Legislative Responses
Although the existence of a medical malpractice crisis is debated by
the legal and medical communities,' state legislators have been unable to
ignore astronomical increases in claim frequency, jury awards, and medical
malpractice insurance premiums.2 Even though the malpractice problem
is attributed in part to the changing environment of the medical practice,,
numerous statutes have responded with legislation to help alleviate the
shortage of insurance coverage for medical care providers and reduce the
number of medical claims going to trial." The medical community and the
1. Compare P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY v (1985) (stating the severe medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s is a continuing
problem in the 1980s and has taken a recent turn for the worse); TILLINGHAST, NELSON
& WARREN, INC., OHIO MALPRACTICE TRENDS 2 (May 1987) (a report submitted to the
Ohio Senate Health, Human Services, and Aging Committee and prepared for the Health
Care Coalition for Professional Liability Reform) (finding no current malpractice crisis
in Ohio but the potential for one in the near future if premium increases continue); and
ABA COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, RECOMMENDATIONS (1986),
noted in Medical Malpractice. The States Respond, 9 HEALTH L. VIGIL, at 12 (Feb.
28, 1986) [hereinafter ABA Recommendations] (committee concluded that the tort law
system in its present form is working fine and changes to the system are unwarranted).
2. See generally P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 2 (documenting the vast increases in
insurance premiums, claim frequency, and award size). During 1974-1975, insurance
premium rates rose by 500% in some states. In other states, insurance became unavailable.
In California, claim frequency and award size increased by 20% per year during the early
1970s, and by 1975, one in three physicians had a malpractice claim pending.
3. In many states the rise in the number of malpractice claims results from the
increased incidence of malpractice. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY REFORM, NOT TORT REFORM 5 (Aug. 27, 1985) (report
of Health Research Group Report to Ohio Senate Health, Human Services and Aging
Committee); Medical Malpractice, 1986: Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on
Health, 116th General Assembly (1986) (testimony of Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D.) (genesis
of medical malpractice problem is the quality of health care). Others believe the problem
is attributable in part to overly zealous attorneys bringing an excessive number of claims.
E.g., P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 4. (Danzon states: "such cases exist, but they are far
from the whole story.") Inequitable distribution of premiums to health care providers in
high risk specialties is cited as still another source of excessive premium rates. NATIONAL
INS. CONSUMER ORGANIZATION, FACT SHEET ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE,
REPORT TO THE OHIO SENATE HEALTH, HUMAN SERVICES, AND AGING COMMITTEE
(1986). Changes in patient and consumer attitudes toward the medical profession and
community hospitals may also be a factor. Sakayan, Arbitration iand Screening Panels:
Recent Experience and Trends, 17 FORUM 682, 682-83 (1981)
4. Sakayan, supra note 3, at 682-83.
5. Letter from A. Robert Davies, M.D., Treasurer, Ohio Society of Internal Medicine,
to Ohio State Senator David Hobson (July 24, 1987) (thanking Senator Hobson for driving
Ohio's malpractice legislation to a successful conclusion); Letter from Herbert E. Gillen,
Exec. Dir., Ohio State Medical Ass'n, to Ohio State Senator David Hobson (June 16,
1987) (expressing support for Ohio malpractice legislation).
public' support such legislation; the legal community has often led the
opposition.'
While legislative responses have not been uniform, the primary goal
of most malpractice statutes was to assure the availability and afford-
ability of malpractice insurance to health care providers. This goal is
best understood as a legislative reaction to shocking increases in insurance
premiums of up to 500 percent in some states To insure available and
affordable coverage, many states have created joint underwriting asso-
ciations consisting of private insurance companies which are required
to provide affordable coverage for health care providers in order to
continue doing business in the state.9 Other states have created public
insurance entities as alternatives to private insurers. 10 In this legislative
scheme, health care providers unable to obtain affordable coverage in
the private sector can seek insurance coverage through the public
provider."
A second goal of the legislation is to reduce the number of claims
going to trial. To achieve this, states have enacted statutes requiring
the screening of malpractice claims prior to trial by a panel of experts. 2
Other states require that the plaintiff's attorney file an affidavit stating
that a physician (or other appropriate expert) has reviewed the allegation
and finds probable cause for instituting a malpractice action. 3 Both
measures discourage the filing of nonmeritorious claims against health-
care providers. 4 Panels may also result in greater settlement of claims
prior to trial, thus reducing the number of claims that proceed to trial. 5
6. When physicians threatened to withdraw services if premium prices continued to
rise, the public pressured state legislatures to act. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 2. Premium
hikes threatened the existence of public health programs as well. Hearings Before the
House Judiciary Committee on H.B. 327, 117th Ohio General Assembly (Apr. 22, 1987)
(testimony of Dr. Virginia Jones, Chief of the Bureau of Maternal and Child Health,
Ohio Dept. of Health).
7. ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 12.
8. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Id. at 85-87.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Sakayan lists some of the states that, as of 1980, had some kind of mandatory
screening statute: Alaska; Arizona; Arkansas; Connecticut; Delaware; Hawaii; Idaho;
Indiana; Kansas; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada;
New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Dakota; Pennsylvania;
Rhode Island; Tennessee; Virginia; and Wisconsin. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 686
n.17. See also OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1987).
13. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.42(C)(1)(a)(i) (Anderson Supp. 19 7).
14. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 686 (mandatory arbitration weeds out unjustified
suits); Ohio State Medical Ass'n, Press Release on H.B. 327 (Mar. 17, 1987) (affidavit
requirement makes it a little more difficult to file a frivolous suit).
15. See Sakayan, supra note 3.
In Hawaii, panel recommendations resulted in a huge percentage of cases settled
or dropped. Between 1976 and 1978, New York showed a post-panel settlement
rate of 60 percent . . . . In Tennessee, 281 cases out of 376 were either settled,
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A third goal of the legislatures has been to streamline the trial
process, thereby making the trial less expensive for both parties. 6 For
instance, Cook County, Illinois has a unique method of expediting the
trial process: the creation of a special malpractice court emphasizing
the pretrial stage by limiting time for discovery and tight scheduling
of trial dates.'7 This process reduces the time spent in malpractice
litigation."9 Screening panels, however, have not been successful in
expediting the trial process and, indeed, frequently result in substantial
delays. 9
This Note considers the efficacy and the constitutionality of screening
panels. Emphasis is given to Ohio's experience with screening panels
and the reasons the 1987 Ohio Legislature decided to repeal this provision
of the Ohio Revised Code? ° Inherent problems of screening panels are
addressed and statutory provisions suggested that could alleviate these
problems, thereby making the process work satisfactorily for both parties.
It is the position of this author that screening panels are a better tool
for preventing frivolous claims than the current Ohio scheme - the
affidavit requirement. 2' Furthermore, the screening process provides a
less formal forum where the parties can assess the strength of the claim,
smoothing the way for realistic settlement discussions.2
B. Screening Panels Defined
Screening panels are the creation of state statute.2 The purpose of
the screening panel is to determine whether or not a claim has sufficient
merit to proceed to trial.' An expert panel, usually consisting of phy-
sicians and lawyers, review the validity and the strength of the claim
and decide if negligence is present. Screening panels also assist the
parties' trial preparation by beginning the discovery process.2 According
withdrawn, or dismissed. New Jersey's rate of disposition was 88 percent after a
panel decision. As a result of Maryland's fifty-seven panel decisions, forty-three
claims were resolved.
Id. at 687.
16. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 198.
17. Id. at 201-02.
18. Id.
19. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 687.
20. See H.B. 327, 117th Ohio General Assembly (1987).
21. See Sakayan, supra note 3, and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 687. Contra OHIO ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS, POSITION PAPER ON
HousE BILL 327 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Apr. 1987). "Lawyers, insurance companies,
physicians and victims of medical malpractice are unwilling to accept anything less than
their day in court .... " Id. This position seems particularly attenuated since trial costs
are enormous. Plaintiffs going to trial can expect to get 40% of their award, the balance
spent on litigation costs. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 31.
23. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 685.
24. Id.
25. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 202.
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to some, the panels are very effective at encouraging pretrial settlement.2
The following paragraphs describe typical provisions in screening panel
statutes.
The selection process is generally provided in the statute. Depending
on the statutory scheme, panels may be selected by the parties, by the
court if the parties cannot agree,27 jointly by the court and the parties,'
or entirely by the court.29 Statutes may have short deadlines requiring
a panel's selection process be completed soon after the filing of a claim.
Relatively short time limits are also set for the rendering of a panel's
recommendations. 31 Under different statutory schemes, a panel either
makes general findings of negligence and assesses damages32 or makes
explicit factual findings. For example, the Alaska statute33 requires the
panel to determine among other things: (1) the plaintiff's disorder, (2)
the plaintiff's probable outcome without medical care, and (3) whether
the treatment was appropriate.?
Panel hearings may be governed by the state procedural rules for
arbitration35 or may have relaxed civil procedural rules.3' A panel has
the power to subpoena witnesses, enforceable by petition to the state
trial court. 7 Panel findings are usually admissible at the trial de novo
upon motion by either party.38 Statutes also provide for payment of the
arbitrators.39 Recent amendments to screening panel statutes in some
states have provided flexibility in the statute's functioning: parties can
agree to waive the screening process,40 and screening is not required for
claims under a specified monetary amount.41 Additionally, costs of the
screening process are allocated to the losing party. 2 In Michigan, for
example, if the panel unanimously finds the claim frivolous, the plaintiff
must post a bond before going forward with the action.4
3
26. See Sakayan, supra note 3.
27. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3(a) (Burns 1983).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
29. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(a) (1962).
30. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3(a) (Burns 1983).
31. E.g., id. at § 16-9.5-9-3.5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-567G (West Supp. 1988) (panel
must render decision 20 days after hearing).
32. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(c) (Anderson Supp. 1987); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. 12-567G (West Supp. 1988).
33. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1962).
34. Id. at § 09.55.536(c)(1), (2), (3) (1962).
35. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(B) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
36. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-567D (West Supp. 1988) (strict adherence to rules
of civil procedure and evidence not required).
37. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.06 (Anderson 1981).
38. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-9 (Bums 1987); ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-567(m)
(West Supp. 1988).
39. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(A) (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1987).
40. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2(b) (Bums 1987).
41. E.g., id. at § 16-9.5-9-2.1.
42. Id. at § 16-9.5-9-10(c).
43. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.4915(2) (West 1987).
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II. EARLY OHIO MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION
A. General Provisions of the 1975 Legislation
The Ohio General Assembly enacted Amended Substitute House Bill
682 in 1975 responding to both physicians' growing concerns about the
availability of liability coverage and the public's concerns about the
availability of medical services." The new legislation had several com-
ponents. It attempted to insure affordable coverage by creating a Joint
Underwriting Association to issue and help fund liability coverage for
health care providers.45 The statute sought to reduce claim frequency
by shortening the statute of limitations for medical claims to one year
against a physician and two years against a hospital." A second provision
to reduce claim frequency was the requirement of pretrial mandatory
screening of medical malpractice claims. 47 A $200,000 damage cap for
claims not involving death sought to slow the escalating damages,4
however, at least two lower Ohio courts held the damage cap
unconstitutional 49 as violative of due process and equal protection
requirements.
The provision for screening panels withstood constitutional scrutiny
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Beatty v. Akron City Hospital,"' but
was immediately attacked as unworkable by the legal community. 2
Critics of the provision from its birth argued that it delayed the filing
of claims and added to the cost of the claim without resolving anything;
if the parties really wanted to litigate the claim, they would continue
to trial regardless of the panel's findings." Critics of mandatory arbi-
tration ultimately succeeded, and the provision was deleted from the
Ohio Revised Code in 1987.1
B. Provisions of the Screening Panel Statute
Former Ohio Revised Code § 2711.21 mandated the convening of a
screening panel upon the filing of a malpractice claim. The panel
44. Ripps, The Ohio Medical Malpractice Statute: An Analysis, 4 Ofo N.U.L. Rnv.
24 (1977).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 26-7.
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 321, 343 N.E.2d 832, 839 (C.P.
Cuyahoga 1976); Duren v. Suburban Comm. Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 29, 482 N.E.2d
1358, 1363 (C.P. Cuyahoga 1985).
50. Id.
51. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 424 N.E.2d 586 (1981).
52. See Ripps, supra note 44, at 35.
53. Id.
54. H.B. 327, 117th Ohio General Assembly (1987).
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consisted of three arbitrators: one selected by the plaintiff, one by the
defendant and one (the chairperson) by the court. All members received
reasonable compensation." General arbitration procedural rules were
incorporated by reference into the medical malpractice statute.5 6
If the determinations of the panel were rejected by either party, the
pleadings had to be amended to aver both the fact that the claim had
been submitted to arbitration, and the specific findings of the panel. 7
Either party could admit the decision of the panel into evidence at trial
provided the court found that the panel's decision was not clearly
erroneous and was in accordance with applicable law. The court also
required that the hearing be fair and procedurally correct." The party
not offering the panel's decision at trial could subpoena any member
of the panel for cross-examination. 9
C. Reasons for Repeal
Initially, the defendants' bar was generally supportive of mandatory
arbitration, while the plaintiffs' bar was generally opposed to itA° By
1987, opposition increased and both the medical and the legal com-
munities favored the repeal of mandatory screening panels. One medical
organization called mandatory arbitration a "costly and ineffective sys-
tem" because the panel proceeding was not binding and the testimony
was simply duplicated at trial.6'
Similarly, the legal community's reaction to the process was negative.
The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers found various problems in the
screening process: panel meetings were difficult to convene because of
schedule conflicts of all interested attorneys; the courts selected the
chairperson based on economic need, not expertise; the parties abused
the process as a discovery tool for subsequent litigation; the parties were
forced to try their case twice-duplicating testimony and increasing
costs; and panel members selected by the parties voted their interests
and did not really provide an objective, expert determination.6 2
The former screening panel provision proved unworkable because of
its lack of specificity regarding the mechanics of the arbitration process.
The statute provided no time limits for the selection, convening, or
decision of the panel. Consequently, delays resulted, and all parties
55. OfIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.21(A) (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1987).
56. Id. at § 2711.21(B) (incorporating §§ 2711.06 - 2711.16).
57. Id. at § 2711.21(c).
58. Id.
59. Id. at § 2711.21(D).
60. Note, Ohio's Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or
Meaningless?, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 361, 380 (1984).
61. See OHIO STATE MEDICAL ASS'N, supra note 14.
62. See OHIO ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 42-43.
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faced with a longer litigation process became disenchanted with screening
panels."
The difficulty in convening a panel of busy professionals who all had
conflicting schedules was one cause of delays, but the Ohio statute did
nothing to limit the length or the frequency of required meetings." The
statute did not provide an accessible means to prevent a party's abuse
of the process. 65 Complaints to a trial court created additional delay,
and as a practical matter would not be brought by the parties for fear
of adversely influencing the panel's decision. Moreover, the statute did
nothing to provide and prepare experts for panel participation. These
omissions in the statute led to its inevitable demise. All of the problems
mentioned, however, can be solved by careful drafting, as evidenced by
states that have functioning and successful screening panels."
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 1987 LEGISLATION
The medical community overwhelmingly supported House Bill 327
(H.B. 327) which deleted the mandatory arbitration provision and in-
stituted various provisions in its place. As a result, support for H.B.
327 cannot be regarded as the medical community's definitive rejection
of screening panels. Rather, it indicates support for a bill which included
a variety of provisions intended to stop premium increases by reducing
award size and reducing the number of medical malpractice claims. 7
The medical community's support was focused primarily on the statute
of limitations changes, the periodic payment provision, the collateral
source rule and the joint and several liability changes - all of which
were expected to reduce liability premiums. 6" Even though the purposes
of the new legislation parallel those of screening panels, the new pro-
visions are not an effective replacement. The new legislation does not
provide any rigorous review of claims, as did screening panels, that will
deter frivolous claims. The documentation requirement discussed above
is no real barrier to nonmeritorious claims. Another strength of screening
panels lay in their encouragement of claim settlement by providing the
63. See supra notes 61-62.
64. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Anderson 1981) (amended 1987)
65. Id.
66. E.g., Indiana, a state experiencing great success with its screening process. Burda,
Pretrial Screening Panels: Useful?, 60 HOSPITALS 35 (Sept. 5, 1986).
67. See OHIO STATE MED. ASS'N, supra note 14.
68. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2304.11(4)(A) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (statement of
legislative intent). The bill was intended to stabilize the marketplace for medical, dental,
optometric and chiropractic professional liability insurance with the concomitant effect of
slowing the upward spiral of medical care costs in the state.
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party with an expert's assessment of the malpractice claim's validity.
Only screening panels provide this unique function; however, this ef-
fective settlement tool has been completely discarded. A synopsis of the
new legislation follows.
A. Statute of Limitations
The changes to the statute of limitations on medical malpractice
claims69 were intended to clarify which claims and which professions
fell within the special statute of limitations. Derivative claims by parents
and relatives for loss of consortium were added to the claims falling
within the one year statute. Two groups of medical professionals were
added to those covered by the statute of limitations: optometrists and
chiropractors.
B. Periodic Payment of Future Damages
Another provision of H.B. 327 strongly supported by the medical
community was the provision for periodic payment of future damages.
Procedures for the payment of future damages above $200,000 period-
ically, rather than in lump sum payment are set forth in the statute. 70
Either the plaintiff or the defendant can submit a periodic payment
plan to the court for approval for damages above $200,000 (damages
below $200,000 and all attorneys costs must be paid in a lump sum)."
The court has the authority to approve, disapprove, or alter proposed
periodic payment plans,72 but can only approve plans where the plaintiff
is adequately assured of receiving all future payments.73 To achieve this,
the court may approve purchase of an annuity from a highly rated life
insurance company. 74 If either party does submit a periodic payment
plan, the court must order the first $200,000 of future damages to be
paid in lump sum and the rest of the award paid in some periodic
payment scheme.75
The periodic payment provision will directly impact premium rates
because it will allow insurers to invest the money set aside for future
payments, thus reducing their overall costs. Future continuous support
for the plaintiff is insured since the plaintiff can't squander his lump
sum payment and later require agency support.
7 6
69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
70. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.57 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
71. Id. at § 2323.57(C)(2), (E)(2).
72. Id. at § 2323.57(D)(1)(d).
73. Id. at § 2323.57(E)(1).
74. Id. at § 2323.57(E)(1)(a).
75. Id. at § 2323.57(C)(1)-(2).
76. See OHIO STATE MED. ASS'N, supra note 14.
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C. Documentation Required Upon Filing a Malpractice Claim
Also enacted was a documentation requirement for any medical,
dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim." The claimant must file one
of three forms of documentation before any state court can exercise
jurisdiction over the claim."8
Under the first alternative to satisfy the documentation requirement,
the claimant's attorney (or the unrepresented claimant) can file an
affidavit stating that the affiant has reviewed the claims with a physician
(or other appropriate expert) who found reasonable cause for com-
mencement of the action."9 If the action is based on informed consent,
the affidavit must include an additional statement to the effect that
the reviewing physician or other expert found that the defendant failed
to disclose and discuss material risks inherent in the procedure, that
the risk actually occurred, and that the risk caused the claimant's
injury.'
Under the second alternative, documentation is also satisfied by the
claimant's attorney (or unrepresented claimant) by filing an affidavit
stating that the affiant was not able to review the claim with an expert
and timely commence the action along with the reasons for this inability."
A subsequent affidavit with an expert's finding of reasonable cause is
required within ninety days of filing the claim.82
Finally, a claimant or claimant's attorney can submit an affidavit
stating that the claimant or the attorney has submitted a written request
to the defendant for the examination of the claimant's records and that
the defendant has failed to produce them within sixty days of the
request. 3 A subsequent affidavit with an expert opinion of reasonable
cause is required within ninety days of receipt of records."
These provisions were intended to discourage the filing of frivolous
claims, 5 but are not as effective as screening panels. It will be much
easier for a plaintiff to find one physician willing to state that the claim
is meritorious than it was to have an objective screening panel make
the same conclusion.
77. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
78. Id. at § 2307.42(B).
79. Id. at § 2307.42(a)(i).
80. Id. at § 2307.43(a)(ii).
81. Id. at § 2307.42(b)(i), (ii).
82. Id. at § 2307.42(C)(2)(a).
83. Id. at § 2307.42(C)(1)(c).
84. Id. at § 2307.42(C)(2)(b).
85. See OHIO STATE MED. ASSN, supra note 14.
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D. Disclosure of Collateral Benefits
The medical community enthusiastically supported House Bill ("H.B.")
1, considered concurrently with H.B. 327.86 One provision of H.B. 1
was the collateral source rule, 7 requiring the plaintiff to disclose to the
court collateral benefits received from governmental or private sources.
After the court determines that the plaintiff has received or is reasonably
certain to receive the benefit within sixty months of judgment, and that
there is no right of recoupment of the benefit, the court will reduce
the award by the amount of the collateral benefit." The court will
increase the award by the amount of the cost of the collateral benefit
to the plaintiff (e.g. premiums paid or other costs). However, if previous
costs exceed benefits, the court will ignore collateral benefits. 9 This
provision was also expected to reduce the size of awards and, conse-
quently, lower premiums."
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SCREENING PANELS
In light of Ohio's negative experience with screening panels, the
obvious question is whether the panel process is ill-conceived and un-
workable. Panels have received mixed reviews from medical and legal
commentators alike.
A. A Study of Arizona's Screening Panels
An evaluation of the Arizona screening panel process was conducted
by the Arizona Medical Association.91 Though the findings of the study
are preliminary because of insufficient data, it suggests that screening
panels have both positive and negative consequences. First, on the positive
side, a downward trend in the number of malpractice claims filed was
noted. This reduction suggests that the panel system is effective in
discouraging frivolous medical malpractice claims, especially since fre-
quency of other types of tort claims rose during the same period. 92 An
alternative explanation of the downward trend, however, could be that
plaintiffs forego small but valid claims because of the tremendous costs
of litigating the claim with the panel process. A second trend is the
86. Id.
87. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.45 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
88. Id. at § 2317.45(B)(2)(c)(ii).
89. Id.
90. See OHIO STATE MED. ASS'N, supra note 14.
91. Howard, An Evaluation of Medical Liability Review Panels in Arizona, 5 STATE
CT. J. 19 (1981).
92. Id.
264
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rise in the number of claims dismissed with stipulation, indicating a
twelve percent increase in cases settled prior to trial, thus furthering
one objective of the Arizona statute93 and screening panels in general.
However, there were negative aspects to the findings as well. On the
average, it is estimated that the panel process added $3,000-4,000 to
the cost of litigating a malpractice claim, an expense allocable mostly
to expert witness fees. 94 A second problem with the system was the
formality and length of the procedure, which served to raise costs. While
Arizona's statute has time limits for appointment, convening, and de-
cisions of the panel, in practice these time limits are regularly ignored. 95
Delay was attributed to two factors. First, it is difficult to convene
a group of busy professionals. Second, the hearings are formally con-
ducted and testimony takes up a great deal of time. Most participants
agree that live testimony is important to properly evaluate the claim. 96
The study also determined that the amount and frequency of awards
among plaintiffs maintaining claims remained stable,97 suggesting that
for plaintiffs with meritorious claims, the process did not prejudice their
award (although the amount they received was necessarily smaller since
litigation costs were increased). Also noteworthy is the fact that juries
at trial feel free to disagree with panel findings. 98 Further, while a
majority of judges believed that the benefits of the process outweighed
the burdens, 99 screening has placed additional processing demands on
the trial courts, the panel judges, and the court staff.'0°
B. Intergovernmental Health Policy Project Study
A second study of screening panels was conducted by the Intergov-
ernmental Health Policy Project (IHPP). °0 IHPP concluded that health
care providers win eighty percent of all panel decisions, a figure equal
to the percentage of cases health care providers win at trial. 0 2 The
study also found that most parties adhere to the panel's findings; therefore
a losing party is more willing to settle or drop the claim. Additionally,
screening panels dispose of malpractice claims at a faster rate than
conventional litigation. 03 The faster disposition of all claims was attrib-
uted to the vast increases in some states of settlement or dismissal
93. Id. at 20-21.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 25.
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 25.
101. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 682, 686.
102. Id. at 686-87.
103. Id. at 686.
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subsequent to the panel's recommendations. 104 However, IHPP also found
that the panel process did not meet the goal of prompt resolution of
all malpractice claims. 05 Many states with screening panels are expe-
riencing a backlog of claims waiting to go to panel, thus hindering a
prompt resolution. 06 The backlog causes include delay in selection
because of a shortage of panel participants and scheduling problems.'0 7
C. Indiana's Successful Screening Statute
At least one state, Indiana, has had a very positive experience with
its screening process, instituted in 1975 and amended in 1985.108 The
screening process had four desirable results: (1) the use of panels has
sped up the resolution of claims by placing time limits on the process;
(2) panels help prepare parties for trial by beginning the discovery
process; (3) panels reduce the number of nuisance claims; and (4) panels
reduce the amounts awarded for those claims not settled. 10 9
In summary, since the screening panel process is relatively new, many
commentators feel evaluation is not possible until more time has elapsed
from the establishment of the process." 0 Many states, as part of their
malpractice legislation, have created commissions to evaluate their med-
ical malpractice statutes. More information on the effectiveness of
current panels will be forthcoming."'
V. PROVISIONS NECESSARY FOR A SUCCESSFUL STATUTE
Clearly, some states have had better experiences with screening panels
than Ohio." 2 Many of Ohio's problems stem from deficiencies in the
statute creating the screening panels, not the system itself. Many view
the panel process as an effective alternative to conventional litigation.
In order to avoid the pitfalls that swallowed the Ohio statute, an explicit
statute with a complementary enforcement mechanism is necessary.
While the Ohio statute was not held unconstitutional," 3 other similar
104. Id. at 687.
105. Id. See also OHIO STATE MEDICAL AS'N, supra note 14.
106. Id. at 687-88. In Pennsylvania, only 18 claims have proceeded to panel out of
a total of 2,422. In Maryland, the backlog of pending cases grows each year. In 1977-
1979, a total of 364 cases were filed; as of May 1, 1981, 134 still awaited a panel hearing.
107. Id. at 688.
108. See Burda, supra note 66.
109. Id.
110. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE A FRAMEwORK
FOR ACTION 31 (May 1987); Report of Medical Malpractice Committee, 20 OHIO
ACADEMY OF CIVIL TRIAL ATry No. 2, at 2 (1985).
111. See OHIO STATE MED. ASS'N, supra note 14.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 91-100 and 108-11.
113. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 487, 424 N.E.2d 586, 595
(1981).
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statutes have been. 114 Some of the constitutional weaknesses can likewise
be avoided by careful drafting.
A. Creation of a Special Malpractice Court
One problem inherent in any.statute that requires participation of a
trial level court is a lack of court-responsiveness because of its already
bulging docket." 5Most statutes require the trial court to participate in
the panel selection process, 116 to enforce procedural requirements, to
supervise discovery if the claim continues beyond screening, and to
subsequently try the case. Because prompt attention of the court is
essential in order to move the claim through the system, a special
malpractice court should be established with jurisdiction over all of
these functions, at least for areas with a high volume of malpractice
claims. The advantages of a special court include the development of
judicial expertise over malpractice matters and a responsive attitude on
the part of the court toward all aspects of medical malpractice litigation.
Establishment of a special court has been very effective in Cook County,
Illinois, where the main focus of the court is accelerating the discovery
process by setting short time limits. 11 7 If the volume of cases in a
particular area does not warrant a special malpractice court, an alter-
native would be to designate a specific judge to respond and to enforce
evidentiary and procedural matters in malpractice claims. s
B. Delay
Among the biggest problems with the Ohio statute,119 and common
to other states as well, 20 is the tendency for screening to lengthen the
total claim processing time. While it is necessarily true that adding a
step to filing claims will lengthen the time before disposition, if the
process works relatively quickly, for example 180 days total time after
selection,' 2' the proven benefits of screening panels are worth that de-
lay.'2 Therefore, the primary focus of a statute should be to set forth
attainable deadlines for each step of the process. The former Ohio
statute had no deadlines whatsoever.123
114. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 686.
115. See Howard, supra note 91, at 25.
116. E.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (Burns 1983).
117. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 201-02.
118. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 689.
119. See OHIO ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 42.
120. See Howard, supra note 91, at 25.
121. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3.5(a) (Bums 1983).
122. See Burda, supra note 66.
123. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2711.21 (Anderson 1981) (amended 1987).
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Examples of workable deadlines can be found in Indiana's Medical
Review Panel Statute.1 4 Not earlier than twenty days after the filing
of the complaint, either party can move for the formation of a panel.125
The parties are required to select a panel chairperson (an attorney who
does not vote) within fifteen days of the request for formation; the court
may assist by drawing up a random list for the parties to choose from.126
Within fifteen days of the selection of the chairperson, the parties must
each choose one panelist. 12 The selected panelists then choose a third
within fifteen days. 128 Short deadlines are imposed when replacement
of any panel member is required. 129 The panel must render an opinion
within 180 days of selection of the last panel member. 130
Unfortunately, even where deadlines are provided by statutes, not all
states' panels have adhered to those deadlines.131 Failure to adhere to
the deadlines results from three problems. First, there may be no penalty
provisions to encourage compliance. Second, any enforcement falls on
an already overburdened court resulting in more delays. 32 Additionally,
it is unlikely that the parties will pressure the panel fearing a negative
influence on the panel's decision. 133
Therefore, the solution should have two components. First, the statute
should provide penalties for noncompliance with deadlines. Second, as
a practical matter, the court would have to enforce the deadlines on
its own initiative because the parties probably, would not, as previously
discussed. 134
C. Scheduling Conflicts
Scheduling conflicts plagued Ohio's statute'35 and others elsewhere136
by inhibiting the panel's ability to convene and causing delays. These
conflicts are avoidable by keeping the number of times the panel must
convene to an absolute minimum. To accomplish this, and to avoid the
delay resulting from testimony,137 oral testimony should be strictly lim-
ited, if not done away with completely. Indiana, for instance, allows
124. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (Burns 1983).
125. Id. at § 16-9.5-9-1(e).
126. Id. at § 16-9.5-9-3(a).
127. Id. at § 16-9.5-9-3(b)(2).
128. Id.
129. Id. at § 16-9.5-9-3(b)(3).
130. Id. at § 16-9.5-9-3.5(a).
131. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 687-88; see also Howard, supra note 91, at 22.
132. See Howard, supra note 91, at 25.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. OHIO ACADEMY TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 22, at 42.
136. See Howard, supra note 91, at 25.
137. Id.
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only written evidence submitted to the panel members, making it avail-
able to all parties. 3 8 Evidence may consist of records, affidavits, excerpts
from treatises, or depositions.1 39 Since some feel live testimony is im-
portant for adequate evaluation of the claim,140 a compromise is possible.
First, a statutory provision could require all evidence to be submitted
to the panel in written form. After an evaluation period of thirty days,
the panel could select and subpoena key witnesses the panel feels they
must question in person to reach a decision. An upper limit on the
number of live witnesses and the length of testimony completes the
process in one or two short sessions.14' A final meeting would be necessary
to make and write up the decision reached.
D. Availability of Experts for Panel Participation
The difficulty in finding experts, physicians, and attorneys to serve
as panel members also causes delays in decisions.1 42 One solution is to
make compensation adequate to attract volunteers. 143 Indiana (where all
voting panel members are physicians) provides a second solution by
requiring all licensed health care providers (except health facility ad-
ministrators) to be available for selection to a panel. 44
E. Discouraging Small but Valid Claims
The screening panel's propensity to discourage small, meritorious
claims because the added cost of the panels is inhibitive has been
severely criticized.1 45 Because small awards will not greatly impact
premium rates, it is not as important to encourage settlement of these
claims. In fact, it could be more expensive for the claims to go through
the panel process than allowing swift adjudication. 46 Again, the Indiana
statute provides a solution by removing the screening requirement for
claims under $15,000.'14 To avoid frivolous claims, the current Ohio
documentation requirement of affidavits would be an adequate replace-
ment for the screening process of small claims.148
138. IND. CODE ANN. § 19-9.5-9-3(b)(1) (Burns 1983).
139. Id.
140. Howard, supra note 91, at 24.
141. Michigan currently limits testimony to 15 minutes unless extraordinary circum-
stances require additional time. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4913(3) (West 1987).
142. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 688.
143. Id.
144. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3(b)(1) (Bums 1983).
145. See Howard, supra note 91, at 20.
146. Id. at 24. The panel process itself averages between $3,000 and $4,000.
147. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2.1(a) (Bums 1983).
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
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F. Reducing Formality of Hearings
Another problem with the screening process experienced in Ohio,149
and in other states with formal evidentiary requirements,1 50 is that the
procedure turns into a mini-trial rather than remaining an informal
evaluation process. 5' A complete relaxing of evidentiary rules has worked
in Indiana. 52 This avoids delays resulting from disputes over evidentiary
rulings.1 53 Since the panels are made up of experienced professionals,
elaborate presentation of the evidence similar to jury trials is regarded
as unnecessary. 5 4 Many of the evidentiary problems will be dispensed
with by strictly limiting live testimony as previously discussed. Un-
doubtedly the panel will function best as an informal process, 55 and
the chairperson should strive to achieve this environment.
G. Selection of the Chairperson
The role of the chairperson can be critical in coordinating meetings
of the panel 5 6 and complying with procedural requirements of the statute,
such as time limits. 5 7 The chairperson is almost always an attorney.
58
In order to both insure the good faith of the chairperson's motives and
to free him from decision-making functions, thus enabling him to focus
on the panel process, the chairperson could serve exclusively as a
coordinator with no vote on the panel. 5 9 A chairperson should be
experienced 160 and familiar with the process. To achieve familiarity, a
procedural manual and an orientation to the process would be helpful.'
6
'
H. Panel Bias
Plaintiffs in particular may believe that health care providers are
inherently biased against malpractice claimants and will vote their
professional interests. 62 This fear can be strengthened if the panel
members are from the same medical community as the defendant health
care providers. 63 Even though members of the medical community reject
149. See OHIO STATE MED. ASS'N, supra note 14.
150. See Howard, supra note 91, at 25.
151. Id.
152. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-5 (Burns 1983).
153. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 689.
154. See Howard, supra note 91, at 24.
155. Id.
156. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 689.
157. Murphy, Pitfalls in Medical Malpractice Panel Practice, 29 REs GESTAE 178,
179 (1985) (warning attorneys to insure the chairman meets mandatory deadlines).
158. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 689.
159. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3. (Burns 1983).
160. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 689.
161. Id.
162. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 200.
163. See Howard, supra note 91, at 23.
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the notion that their decisions are biased toward the position of their
peers, 164 certain safeguards should be followed to minimize the potential
for bias. Parties can have panel members who are close colleagues of
the defendant dismissed from the panel. 165 When practicable, panels
could be selected from groups somewhat insulated from the general
professional community. For example, a medical educator may be more
objective of the malpractice situation than a practicing surgeon. Simi-
larly, medical care providers who have been successfully or unsuccessfully
sued for malpractice may be dismissed.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
There have been several successful constitutional challenges to screen-
ing panels. 166 Some types of challenges can be avoided by altering the
operation of the panels. Others cannot be. If courts view the screening
panel mechanism as usurping the judicial function of decision-making
or the jury function of fact-finding, the statute is probably doomed. 67
Most state courts have not found screening panels facially unconstitu-
tional but rather unconstitutional in operation because of undue delays
before the panel 68 The United States Supreme Court has not considered
the issue. 169 If panels are racked by substantial delays, there is a risk
they may be found unconstitutional in operation. 170 The steps suggested
to limit delay should shield the statute from this type of constitutional
challenge.
VII. CONCIUSION
State legislators will continue to seek solutions to the malpractice
problem since in most states premium rates and health care costs continue
to rise. One tactic is to reduce the number of claims going to trial.
Screening panels accomplish this by discouraging frivolous claims and
encouraging pretrial settlement. Unfortunately, rather than revamping
a poorly drafted statute, the Ohio Legislature chose to discard this
process. The new documentation requirement will not be as effective in
screening out frivolous claims; there is no other statutory provision that
164. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-3(b)(3) (Burns 1983).
165. See Sakayan, supra note 3, at 686.
166. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 157, at 181. While Indiana's statute withstood
constitutional challenge, both the Florida and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts held screening
panels unconstitutional because of undue delay during the panel process.
167. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 189.
168. See Murphy, supra note 157, at 181.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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will encourage pretrial settlement. Only screening panels have this
characteristic.
Other states enacting new screening panel statutes or amending their
current provisions can avoid many of Ohio's problems by careful drafting.
If specific time limits for each stage of the screening process are provided
and enforced, the problem of delay can be solved. States with well-
drafted statutes are now praising screening panels as one step toward
halting the rise of liability premiums for health care providers and
insuring affordable health care to the public.
Debra L. Fortenberry
